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Chaparro (Osbaldo) v. State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op 68 (Nov. 10, 2021)1
ZOOM VIDEOCONFERENCE HEARINGS: A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
AT SENTENCING HEARING
SUMMARY
The Court answered if a defendant’s right to be present was violated when the sentencing
hearing was conducted via Zoom videoconferencing because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The
Court concluded that the defendant’s sentencing hearing was just considering the surrounding
circumstances, and that he was not entitled to relief. The Court also found that the admitted
evidence of the defendant’s previous conviction was proper and that district courts should not
categorically limit questions about jurors’ views concerning whether a defendant has prior
convictions. Additionally, the Court held that inconclusive evidence can be relevant and
admissible when used to show that an investigation was thorough or is presented to complete a
story regarding a particular piece of evidence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 17, 2016 in the early morning, L.L. was walking in downtown Reno towards
the Harrah’s casino when Chaparro grabbed her. Chaparro groped her buttocks and breasts, and
digitally penetrated her. L.L. struggled and yelled that she would call 9-1-1. When L.L.’s friend
approached, Chaparro quickly left. L.L. reported the assault, underwent a sexual assault exam, and
the Harrah’s security system captured footage of the assault.
Chaparro was charged with sexual assault, battery with the intent to commit sexual assault
upon a victim age 16 or older, and open or gross lewdness. The State moved to admit evidence of
Chaparro’s prior conviction for battery with the intent to commit sexual assault where he groped
and accosted P.J. in the parking lot of the Nugget Casino Resort. He opposed the motion arguing
it was unfairly prejudicial, but the district court grated the motion and allowed P.J. to testify at
trial. At trial, Chaparro argued that he neither penetrated L.L. nor intended to do so and was
therefore innocent of the sexual assault and battery with intent charges. The jury convicted him of
all charges in February 2020.
The COVID-19 pandemic required courts across the country to halt in-person hearings.2
As a result, Chaparro’s sentencing hearing was held over Zoom on May 20, 2020. He joined the
videoconference call from a jail courtroom and was able to communicate with counsel
confidentially via headset and could see and hear the other participants. The only thing Chaparro
could not see and hear were the members of the public who chose to watch including his friends
and family. However, the members of the public could see and hear Chaparro throughout the
duration of the hearing. Chaparro objected to the use of Zoom stating that he wanted to see his
supporters, but the district court overruled the objection and proceeded with the hearing. The
district court sentenced Chaparro to an aggregate sentence of life with parole eligibility after 12
years.
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DISCUSSION
Chaparro’s due process challenge to the sentencing hearing over Zoom
The first issue on appeal is whether Chaparro’s due process rights were violated by holding
his sentencing hearing over Zoom. The Court acknowledged that because a sentencing hearing is
a critical stage,3 a defendant has the right to be present for sentencing. But the court distinguished
the right by stating that the right to present is not absolute.4 The Court noted that the presence of a
defendant is a condition of due process that is limited such that a fair and just hearing would be
prevented by the defendant’s absence.5 Therefore, considering whether Chaparro’s hearing was
fair and just despite its deviation from the norm, the Court concluded that it was appropriate
considering the circumstances of the pandemic. Chaparro was able to be heard, seen, speak, and
confidentially communicate with counsel.6 The Court stated that the district court balanced
Chaparro’s various rights appropriately, and acknowledged that the realities of the assessing the
district court’s decision could not be separated from the circumstances in which the proceeding
took place.7
Chaparro also contended that his confrontation rights were violated. The Court declined to
consider this claim by Chaparro because this claim was being raised for the first time on appeal.8
Chaparro further argued that he had a right to the in-person presence of friends and family, but
provided no supporting authority for the expansion of the right to be present to third parties.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony regarding the prior assault
and conviction
The second issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in admitting testimony
regarding the prior assault and conviction. In determining whether to admit a prior sexual offense
pursuant to NRS 48.045(3), the district court must both make a preliminary finding that the prior
sexual offense is relevant, and find that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the bad act constituting a sexual offense occurred. 9 The Court then specified that a
district court should evaluate whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice by considering five different factors.10 The Court
disagreed with Chaparro that the evidence was not necessary to the State’s case and that the
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Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 367, 23 P.3d 227, 240 (2001), abrogated on other grounds by Nunnery v. State,
127 Nev. 749, 263 P.3d 235 (2011).
5
United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985); see Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 1000, 923 P.2d 1102,
1115 (1996) (“The due process aspect has been recognized only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be
thwarted by the defendant’s absence.”).
6
Cf. People v. Lindsey, 772 N.E.2d 1286, 1276–79 (Ill. 2002) (holding the due process right was not violated where
defendant participated in critical stages of arraignment and jury waiver by audiovisual transmission and “was able to
interact with the court with relative ease,” and noting similar holdings by other state supreme courts).
7
See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934) (“Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be
fair, but fairness is a relative, not absolute, concept. It is the fairness with reference to particular conditions or
particular results.”).
8
See Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1260, 946 P.2d 1017, 1030 (1997) (declining to consider appellate claim where
objection was not made below).
9
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probative value evaluation was in err. The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence because it weighed the factors appropriately.
The district court did not err in limiting voir dire
The third issue on appeal is whether Chaparro was improperly barred from asking
prospective jurors questions regarding the effect that evidence of his prior conviction might have
on their deliberation in his case. NRS 175.031 states that when conducting the initial examination
of potential jurors, the defendant or their attorney as well as the district attorney are entitled to add
to the examination by asking more question as the court deems appropriate.11 It also states that any
further examination must not be unreasonably restricted.12 The Court recognized that purpose of
voir dire is to determine whether jurors provide a fair and impartial trial,13 but also that the scope
and method is within the district court’s discretion and they will review for an abuse of discretion
or a showing of prejudice.14
The Court held on this issue that the district court appropriately limited Chaparro from
inquiring into specific evidence that would be presented at trial because the line of questioning
risked depriving Chaparro of an impartial jury.15 Here, the district court did not categorically
obstruct questioning into the general issue of potential jurors’ views on defendants with previous
convictions and thus it did not err.16
The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony on inconclusive DNA evidence
The fourth issue on appeal was if the district court erred when it allowed evidence of a
DNA tested pair of tights that the victim was wearing during the incident and the results were
inconclusive. The Court ruled that when DNA test results are inconclusive, they can be relevant
and probative to determining the reliability and sufficiency of the investigation.17 The Court further
found that inconclusive evidence may be relevant to the State’s presentation of a complete story
regarding a certain piece of evidence. So here, the Court held that the tights in question were
relevant because they showed the thoroughness of the investigation and completed the story of the
evidence.
Cumulative Error
Finally, the Court determined whether there was cumulative error that denied Chaparro of
a fair trial. The Court rejected Chaparro’s assignments of err, and concluded that his allegation
lacked merit.
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CONCLUSION
The Court concluded that Chaparro was not denied a fair and just trail caused by the
pandemic’s in-person restrictions, because he was provided with an appropriate alternative. The
Court concluded on the issue of the admission of the prior conviction that the district court did not
err. The Court ruled that district courts should not categorically limit inquiry during voir dire into
jurors’ views regarding defendants with prior convictions, and that the district court here did not
err when it barred inquiry into Chaparro’s specific prior conviction. Lastly, the Court affirmed the
conviction and clarified that inconclusive DNA evidence can be admitted where it is relevant and
is otherwise aligned with the rules of evidence.

